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TORT LIABILITY
TORT LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS OF ELECTRICITY*
LESTER W. FEEZERt
In an article appearing several years ago,' the present writer
discussed a number of cases involving hazards arising in the
operation of certain public and quasi-public enterprises, includ-
ing municipal corporations, gas companies, and waterworks. An
attempt was made to point out a noticeable tendency in a number
of recent cases to extend liability in tort to situations in which
the court had traditionally refused to give relief. It was sug-
gested that this tendency may be due in part to a desire of courts
to place the burden of such losses where they can be distributed
as a part of the cost of the service which the defendant is in the
business of supplying. In short, it was suggested that the con-
suming public and society should bear the cost of the hazards of
these enterprises, since society enjoys the benefits of these group
services. Any such tendency, if it actually does exist in the law,
must be discovered not merely by reference to what judges have
said in their opinions, but by observing, in general, how these
cases are decided. In what types of fact situations does the plain-
tiff prevail? Are the decisions in which the modern court affords
protection really within the traditional scope of familiar rules
of law, as the limits of these rules have been recognized in the
past, or do many of such decisions enlarge the limits of the pro-
tection afforded by these rules?
Electricity probably is potentially the most dangerous of the
utilities in common use today. Leaking gas normally can be de-
tected by its odor, and probably most gas leaks are discovered
and repaired before serious injury results. Water escaping from
confinement frequently announces itself to sight or hearing be-
fore it does substantial harm. However, as stated in a recent
Missouri case:
"Electricity is a most subtle and dangerous agency. It
lurks unsuspected in the simple and harmless wire and gives
* This article has been prepared with particular regard to Missouri cases.
f Professor of Law, University of South Dakota Law School; Visiting
Professor of Law, University of Missouri, 1935-36.
1. Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss As a Factor in the Decision of Certain
Types of Tort Cases (1930) 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 805; Ibid. (1931) 79 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 742.
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no warning of its dangerous presence. Wherefore, it is uni-
formly held that an electric company employing wires
charged with this subtle and violent agency in streets, high-
ways and other public places is in duty bound either to
insulate such wires or place them beyond the range of con-
tact with persons rightfully using such ways and to exer-
cise the utmost care to keep them so."1'
Such then, broadly and generally stated, is the nature of the
hazard and the high degree of care which is recognized judicially
as present in connection with harms due to electricity.
The electric fluid has come to be one of man's chief aids in
maintaining the complex civilization of the present day. If the
production of electric current were to stop throughout the civil-
ized world-even for a few days-it is hardly possible to imag-
ine the disorganization of the whole social scheme. Indeed, it is
not an exaggeration to say that we cannot do without it. At the
same time, unless it is kept strictly within the boundaries set for
it, electric current is capable of almost incalculable damage to
life and property. There is, then, an economic and social inter-
est in fostering and encouraging its use and further develop-
ment, but unless considerations of safeguarding interests of per-
sonality are balanced against economic considerations favoring
free development of the industry, intolerable risks of harms to
both person and property may be created.
Innumerable statutes and ordinances prescribe standards to
be observed in the construction and operation of electrical plants
and in the installation of wiring and appliances. At the same
time injuries continue to occur. How shall responsibility be im-
posed? It seems to be a settled policy that absolute liability shall
not be the rule. An electric company is not an insurer against
loss by reason of its structures and apparatus and their opera-
tion.2 Liability is said to depend ,upon negligence. We must,
therefore, come back to the old problem of negligence. Negligence
here, as everywhere, must be measured by duty. That duty must
be determined by the courts ex post facto of the harm. Are the
la. Gelsmann v. Missouri-Edison Electric Company, 173 Mo. 654, 73
S. W. 654 (1903). There are so many cases in Missouri, asserting the high
degree of care which must be exercised in the control of dangerously high
voltage currents, that it would be beside the point to collect them here.
2. Luehrmann v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 127 Mo. App. 213, 104 S. W.
1128 (1907); Goodwin v. Columbia Telephone Co., 157 Mo. App. 596, 188
S. W. 940 (1911).
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courts determining that duty upon the basis of a formula of
words, of an abstract delineation of what an electric company
may or may not do and escape the judgment of negligence and
the imposition of liability to respond in damages therefor? Are
they, on the contrary, influenced by other factors, human and
social? Are they judging electric companies in tort actions by
human experience?
The social needs of electricity in the normal life of everybody
are increasing. This calls for more powerful currents, but at
the same time for more careful safeguards. An accident hap-
pens, someone is injured or killed. Who shall bear the loss?
What conduct will shift the loss to the electric company, and
what factors are employed in determining that conduct? Is the
capacity to bear the loss a factor in determining duty? If so,
the courts have been slow to admit it. This contrasts with the
cases in the field of municipal corporations. In that field we
find the law changing. An abandonment in many cases of an
old and outworn formula, that of governmental immunity, is
clearly apparent. In such a movement in the law there come
frank articulate expressions, now and then, of the courts' recog-
nition of such social factors as capacity to bear loss. These ex-
pressions indicate that the whole tendency to shift from the old
rule in that field is probably actuated by these impulses. But in
electricity we are dealing with something new. There may be
factors peculiar to the economic and social utility of the elec-
trical industry. The "mores" of the time and place, public opin-
ion, the social sanctions, or whatsoever they may be called, may
have a bearing upon allocating the risks which great utilities
create by their existence. This all plays its part in judgment.
The social utility of placing the risk of loss where it can more
easily be borne, because it can more easily be distributed, may
be reflected in the way the judicial process applies its general
fundamentals and its detailed formulas and rules to the solu-
tion of the tort problems which are peculiar to the operation
of the electrical industry. For, by so doing, they will have sig-
nified their attitude as to the extent of the duty on the part of
manufacturers of electric current to keep it where it can do only
useful service and not harm to mankind. No new formulas are
needed or desirable in order to enable the courts to extend con-
19s7]
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cepts of legal responsibility founded upon culpability so as to
cover the new risks of harm which arise out of new conditions.
The court has merely to find whether the defendant's conduct
involved a risk of harm, which, under the circumstances shall
be thrust upon him who engages in such conduct. Invoking the
external standard of the reasonably prudent man is simply an-
other way of saying the same thing. The court has only to find
whether there is a duty; that is, whether the law recognizes an
interest of the plaintiff or injured person which is entitled to
protection.
If the court decides that a duty exists in the premises or if
this question is brought to issue in the pleadings, there remain
the usual elements of a negligence case: violation of duty, causal
relation, and damage. These elements of the problem are handled
by a division of labor between the court and jury, to be marked
out by the court in accordance with the usual formulas employed
in negligence cases.
The external standard of the reasonably prudent man can be
applied to these problems as it has been in other problems of
negligence, and the orthodox formulas are flexible enough to
enable any court to give effect to the social policy which is be-
hind its judgments. The consequence of this may be that almost
any harm from electricity which could humanly have been
avoided, will have to be paid for. On the other hand, emphasis
may be given to formulas which tend to restrict liability within
narrow limits.8 Proximate cause formulas may be used to re-
strict liability or to enlarge it. 4 Contributory negligence may be
3. "The law in regard to the proper handling of electric currents is of
comparatively recent development and is still to a great extent in its forma-
tive period. The decisions on the subject are in hopeless confusion and
cases can be found supporting almost any view as to the extent of the
responsibility of those engaged in dealing with such currents." Salt River
Valley Waters Users Ass'n v. Compton, 39 Ariz. 491, 8 P. (2d) 249 (1932).
4. Vessels v. Kansas City Light & Power Co., 219 S. W. 80 (Mo., 1920),
in which one of two joint defendants was not permitted to "pass the buck"
by the use of proximate cause theories. But in a case where the plaintiff
was injured by contact with a piece of baling wire which boys threw over
the defendant's high tension line at an uninsulated spot, the act of the boys
was held to be the proximate cause. Luehrmann v. Laclede Gas Light Co.,
127 Mo. App. 213, 104 S. W. 1128 (1907). However, when the dangerous
condition (uninsulated wires) had existed so long that defendant knew or
should have known of it and this was at a place where it was known that
persons frequently went, defendant was held liable, notwithstanding the
intervention of a third party. Strack v. Missouri & Kansas Telephone Co.,
216 Mo. 601, 116 S. W. 526 (1908).
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treated with an open hand and left to juries in almost any situ-
ation, or it may be found by the court as a matter of law in cer-
tain typical situations. Such doctrines as res ipsa loquitur may
be liberally or sparingly used.
STANDARD OF CARE
The scope of duty will contract or expand as problems arise,
but "standard of care" is a generalization about which we may
expect to find sufficient decisions to point the way in which the
policy and inclination of the courts of a particular jurisdiction
are tending.
In looking for expressions with reference to the standard of
care required by the law in the handling of electricity, it is at
once evident that this standard develops with reference to the
type and degree of harms risked and to the setting in which they
are consumated.
It would be at once recognized by an intelligent child of twelve
that the risky thing about electricity is shock. The child would
not need to be many years older to know that seriously harmful
electric shocks result when electric currents are where they ought
not to be, or when persons shocked are where they ought not
to be. If the person injured is where he may rightfully be
and has not assumed the risk of unconfined and dangerous elec-
tric current, what is the duty of those in the control of the elec-
tricity? Due or reasonable care under the circumstances is pres-
ent as a part of the circumstances. The problem is, what does
that phrase mean in the electric cases?5
In Missouri it seems to be clearly established that the stand-
ard of care in electricity cases is not an open field, but juries
are directed more precisely. Reference has already been made
to the utmost degree of care. Many cases in the Supreme Court
as well as in the three Courts of Appeal have reiterated the idea
that producers of electricity have the burden of a special degree
of care. These references to the highest degre of care seem to
be more than a phrase for emphasizing "circumstances," in ap-
5. The Missouri courts have consistently said that they do not recognize
degrees of negligence, but they do recognize degrees of care; "but the
failure to exercise even the highest degree of care is only negligence."
Young v. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry., 227 Mo. 307, 127 S. W. 19 (1910). As
early as 1869, the Supreme Court declared that there is no such thing as
gross negligence. McPheeters v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. Co., 45 Mo.
22 (1869).
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plying the concept of "due care under the circumstances." It is
common to find references to the "highest degree of care." All
of these expressions may or may not determine the duty, the
alleged violation of which the jury may be asked to pass upon.
The fact variations are so numerous *that there may be found
a mass of decisions, impossible to reduce to a satisfactory scien-
tific classification. From these cases it seems impossible to induce
any precise formulas which will fit future cases.
The most typical cause of harm is shock due to current being
where it should not be. The most frequent causes of electric cur-
rents being out of bounds seem to be sagging wires, broken
wires, defective insulation, defective transformers, and wires
located in places where they may be dangerous by reason of
proximity to persons or to other objects which may carry the
current where it will be dangerous.
Geismann v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co.,7 decided in the Su-
preme Court of Missouri in 1902, has been cited and referred to
in subsequent cases as the foundation case on negligence in con-
nection with electricity.8 The deceased with other workmen was
on a ladder, taking down a sign from a building. A guy wire
which had been used to support the sign and which the deceased
was touching, came in contact with a part of the defendant's
wires, from which the insulation had been worn away. The
shock caused the deceased to fall, and he died as a result of the
fall. There was a verdict for the plaintiff. The judgment was
affirmed in an opinion, too lengthy to refer to in detail, which
reviewed the several instructions given in the St. Louis County
Circuit Court. Judge Burgess's opinion is interesting and signi-
ficant in that it outlined more fully than had been done in any
previous Missouri case the general standards which are the de-
terminants of liability in this type of case. After holding that
the defendant's demurrer to the evidence was properly overruled,
the opinion, in discussing the instructions given in the trial
6. Salt River Valley Waters Users Ass'n v. Compton, 39 Ariz. 491, 8
P. (2d) 249 (1932), cited note 3, supra.
7. 173 Mo. 654, 73 S. W. 654 (1903).
8. The Geismann case is not the earliest decision in Missouri dealing
with tort liability in connection with electricity, but is one of the earlier
ones most frequently cited in subsequent opinions. An earlier case fre-
quently met with is Gannon v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 145 Mo. 502, 46 S. W.
968 (1898).
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court, makes the statements which have furnished the basis for
the decision of many subsequent cases. The court said:
"It follows from these authorities that it was defendant's
duty in the first place to use every protection which was rea-
sonably accessible to insulate its wires at the point of con-
tact or injury in this case and use the utmost care to keep
them so, and the fact of the death of Geismann is conclusive
proof of the defect of the insulation and negligence of the
defendant. As to whether he was guilty of contributory
negligence or not was a question for the jury."
The case has repeatedly been taken as authority for the points
stated in the sentence just quoted.,
It has been bought out in a7 number of more recent cases that
insulation is impracticable and useless in lines charged with ex-
tremely high voltage carried on modern long distance transmis-
sion lines. Compliance with the high standard of care imposed
means, in such a situation, that the wires must be located where
persons are not likely to come into contact with them. 0 In one
case it was said: "The great number of injuries inflicted by elec-
tric wires strung near buildings is enough to show that care
should be taken to protect persons laboring on and about such
buildings."' Likewise wires must be maintained at a safe
height. 2
Upon beginning one's reading of cases involving injurious elec-
tric shock, one is surprised at the frequency with which guy
wires become charged by coming into contact with sagging,
loose, uninsulated lines carrying heavy voltage current. The con-
duct of those responsible for maintaining such structures has
usually been regarded as sufficient basis for responsibility, unless
the injured person's contributory negligence is present to bar
recovery.13
9. Followed in Winkelman v. Kansas City Electric Light Co., 110 Mo.
App. 184, 85 S. W. 99 (1905), and Booker v. Southwest Mo. Ry. Co., 144
Mo. App. 273, 128 S. W. 1012 (1910). Cited in Luehrmann v. Laclede Gas
Light Co., 127 Mo. App. 213, 104 S. W. 1128 (1907).
10. Day v. Consolidated Light, Power & Ice Co., 136 Mo. App. 274, 117
S. W. 81 (1909) ; Thompson v. City of Lamar, 322 Mo. 514, 17 S. W. (2d)
960 (1929); Lofty v. Lynch McDonald Co., 215 Mo. App. 163, 256 S. W.
83 (1923).
11. Williams v. City of Fulton, 177 Mo. App. 177, 164 S. W. 247 (1914).
12. Heiberger v. Mo. & Kan. Telephone Co., 133 Mo. App. 452, 113 S. W.
730 (1908).
13. Freeman v. Mo. & Kan. Telephone Co., 160 Mo. App. 271, 142 S. W.
733 (1912); Hoover v. Kansas City Elevated Ry. Co., 159 Mo. App. 416,
140 S. W. 321 (1911).
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It is likewise actionable -to place guy wires in a dangerous
location, and doing so may result in liability through an unusual
chain of circumstances, as shown in a recent Missouri case. 14 A
guy wire leading from an electric light pole was broken by a
truck which ran off the road. The broken guy wire came in
contact with high voltage wires. The plaintiff, arriving on the
scene just after the accident, went to the rescue of the truck
driver. While he was thus engaged, the broken, electrically-
charged guy wire fell upon him. The plaintiff alleged negligence
in the way the guy wires were placed, referring to the possibil-
ity of automobile accidents at this particular dangerous point
in the highway and to the lack of insulation on such high voltage
wires. It was held that the case was correctly sent to the jury,
there being sufficient evidence to justify a finding of negligence.1s
There are numerous cases in which broken wires have fallen
on the ground, or into trees, or have otherwise carried a danger-
ous current to a point where it may be encountered in streets or
on private premises. Such wires or currents are encountered by
people seeking to pass, sometimes unconscious, sometimes per-
haps conscious of the presence of a wire, but without realization
that it is "hot". The fact is recognized that electric wires do
break sometimes, due to causes not the fault of the owner. What
then is the nature and extent of the duty to discover and remove
the danger? Among the most interesting of the Missouri electric
cases are the ones bearing upon this problem.
Engineering developments in the field of electricity are so
rapid that to attempt to make legal formulas as to what is rea-
sonable care in handling electric current would be futile. New
devices are constantly being produced for use in the operation
of electrical machinery; new principles are being discovered. Is
the law to pass upon this mechanical and scientific apparatus,
piece by piece, and determine whether it shall be used, and if so,
in what manner?
Within recent years devices known as automatic circuit break-
14. Thornton v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 72 S. W. (2d) 161
(Mo. App., 1934).
15. The case was reversed and remanded because of an improper instruc-
tion to the effect that it was negligence in law to maintain an uninsulated
high tension line adjacent to a highway. In short, the law recognizes the
point made by the defendant that insulation is not necessarily the only or
the best protection against the dangers of high voltage currents.
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ers have been installed and are in regular use in electric plants,
as a safeguard against the wandering of high voltage electrical
energy from its intended path into places where it does not
belong. Therefore, in cases of injury due to misplaced electric
current, the question arises whether it is the duty of electric
companies to use circuit breakers. It becomes the task of a judge
to decide whether the absence of a circuit breaker, or the manner
of its use, bears such relation to the plaintiff's injury in the par-
ticular case, that a jury properly may be given the opportunity
to impose legal responsibility for acts or omissions in reference
to such a machine. That is, the court must decide whether there
is a duty to install and properly to maintain and operate such a
device.
Another device known as a "ground detector" has apparently
come into use with electric transmission lines. In Sanders v. City
of Carthage", the plaintiff's decedent, an eleven year old boy,
while driving with his father, came to a broken end of wire
hanging over the road too low to drive under. He undertook to
remove it and was electrocuted. There was evidence tending to
show that the wire had been down since the previous evening.
The defendant had no ground detector, but it did have a circuit
breaker, which, however, does not always "kick out" unless both
sides of a circuit are grounded. A ground detector on the other
hand would have indicated a break in one wire of a circuit and
16. 9 S. W. (2d) 813 (1928), rev'd 330 Mo. 844, 51 S. W. (2d) 529
(1932), on the ground that plaintiff having alleged specific acts of negli-
gence was allowed to go to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur.
As to ground detectors, circuit breakers and similar appliances, it was
said in Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Moore, 224 Ky. 33, 5 S. W. (2d) 283
(1928): "Those engaged in the business must use the highest degree of
care but are not insurers. Those who deal in this deadly, unseen instru-
mentality must exercise the utmost care and skill which may be known....
all that the ingenuity of man has devised must be made use of." The
opinion then quoted with approval from the testimony of an expert who had
appeared in the trial of the case, as follows: "I think this, that if any
company is to sacrifice safety to practical economic operation, then they
should be willing to bear the burden of expense, damages or anything else
resulting from their lack of care and skill in constructing their lines
safely.... In other words my idea is, that, if the company wants to in
any way run the chances, which may be one in a thousand of electrocuting
somebody and not make the equipment absolutely safe so that there wouldn't
be any chance of electrocuting anybody, then they run that chance for the
purpose of economic gain and under that consideration they ought to be
willing to pay for any damages which would occur due to their negligence
to safeguard the public."
19371
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the plant could have cut off the current until the condition
was repaired. This situation having been shown, the court said:
"As we see it the question of the defendant's negligence
narrows down to the question of the defendant's duty to have
its switchboard equipped with ground detectors. If a ground
detector would have indicated the interference caused (by
the wire breaking and falling on a tree), it was the defen-
dant's duty in the exercise of that highest degree of care
required by the law to have had such an instrument."
The court also held that the whole question whether the defen-
dant was negligent in failing to discover the broken wire for
twelve hours was for the jury.17
In a California case 8 the court instructed the jury that the
plaintiff in his complaint had sufficiently charged negligence, by
his allegation that the defendant's servant had closed the circuit
breaker after it had "kicked out" and had held it closed, and
that the jury might find for the plaintiff if they found that this
allegation was true.
In 1928, the Supreme Court of Kentucky passed on the ques-
tion whether closing an automatic circuit breaker after it had
"kicked out" was such negligence as to make the company re-
sponsible for the electrocution of one who touched the wire after
it had been thus closed.1" The Kentucky case calls attention to
17. The duty to act promptly upon the information afforded by a ground
detector was made the basis of liability in Kidd v. Kansas City Light and
Power Co., 239 S. W. 584 (1922); Pulsifer v. City of Albany, 226 Mo. App.
529, 47 S. W. (2d) 233 (1932). It was pointed out in these cases that,
having no circuit breaker or ground detector, it was the duty of the de-
fendant to check over its wires promptly after a storm.
18. Harker v. So. California Edison Co., 256*Pac. 848 (Cal. App., 1927).
The case here presented the issue similarly as to improper groundings of
transformers and as to the sizes of fuses to be used to afford adequate pro-
tection. In this case an "overload" caused a fire which damaged the plain-
tiff's plant. (Hearing denied by Supreme Court).
19. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Woodrum's Adm., 224 Ky. 33, 5 S. W. (2d)
283 (1928). Four men were cutting down a tree. It broke a wire in falling,
although they apparently used all reasonable precautions. One of them
moved the wire, without harm, due to the kicking out of the circuit breaker.
In moving about the tree the father touched this wire and was killed. The
sons endeavored to pull him away from the wire. One of them was killed
and the other injured. As indicated in supra, note 16, the court stated a
very high degree of duty of care as applicable to these cases, but finally
held that the defendant was not the cause of the disaster, because it could
not foresee that anyone would be hurt. The court has here fallen into the
all too common fault of applying the "foreseeability of harm" test for the
existence of negligence to the question of the limitation of responsibility
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss3/2
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the various interests involved in a situation of this sort. Sup-
pose that, after dark, a breaker "kicks out" on a line supplying
light and power to many people. Shall the breaker be closed at
once, thus restoring service at least up to the point of the break,
or shall a town or part of a town be left in darkness until the
exact location of the break is discovered and such precautions
taken as will preclude anyone's being injured by a broken wire?
In the instant case it was held not negligent to close the circuit
at once. Three dissenting judges subscribed to the result but put
it on the ground of contributory negligence. They protested their
outraged sense of justice that an electric company should leave
lives imperilled by a broken wire, but were willing to deny re-
covery in the name of contributory negligence, and seemed to
think that anyone who attempts to remove a fallen wire is guilty
thereof.2
0
It is hard to say which opinion is the more unsatisfactory. If
the dissent wished to bring in causation, as a means of rational-
izing its result, that line of argument might have been continued
a further step and have dealt with the case in terms of "last clear
chance." It might then have been said that the defendant had
for negligence and has thus taken the whole issue of fact into its own
hands. Toney v. Interstate Power Co. 180 Iowa 1362, 163 N. W. 394 (1917),
where it was held correctly left to the jury whether it was negligent to
reclde the circuit breaker.
20. As to whether it is contributory negligence to move a live wire
which Is broken and endangering traffic on the streets, or other activities
of persons rightfully in its vicinity, see Murphy v. Iowa Elec. Co. 206 Iowa
567, 220 N. W. 360 (1928). A highway contractor's employee was attempt-
ing to get a fallen telephone .wire out of the way, when it made contact
with high voltage wires on the same poles. A verdict was directed for the
defendant on ground of contributory negligence. But see Abilene Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Thomas, 211 S. W. 600 (Tex., 1919), in which a wire was
down and touched a barn. Plaintiff's decedent attempted to strike it away
with a stick in order to save a horse. The end flew around and struck him.
A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed, on the ground that it was negligent
not to have ground detectors and circuit breakers, in which case the wire
would have been dead. In Sprinkles v. Mo. Public Utilities Co., 183 S. W.
1072 (1916), a power wire sagged and made contact with a light wire. It
sagged in turn, touched a guy wire, burned in two, and its ends fell. The
town marshal attempted to move the ends out of the way of a pedestrian
and was killed. A verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed. See 61 A. L. R.,
1028 Anno., on injury to firemen, policemen or other public officials coming
in contact with live wires in their effort to protect others. In Workman v.
Lincoln Tel. and Tel. Co., 102 Neb. 191, 166 N. W. 550 (1918), a telephone
wire broke and made contact with high voltage light wire. Plaintiff's dece-
dent, an experienced electrical worker, attempted to move it with pliers
wrapped with insulating tape; the end of wire touched a lantern held in
his other hand. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.
19371
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the last chance to prevent the accident when its employee decided
whether or not to close the circuit. This reasoning, however,
would not be valid in those states which recognize the doctrine
of last clear chance only where the defendant has discovered the
plaintiff's peril. But, after all, why go around Robin Hood's
barn to capture the simple point? Was there a duty to leave
the circuit open? Was it negligence to close the circuit? In spite
of all that has been said to confuse the question, courts determine
the duty upon which to predicate negligence cases, by asking
whether an ordinarily prudent man would have foreseen harm as
likely to result from closing the breaker. If these breakers are
not to be used to protect against just such contingencies as arose
in the Kentucky case, may not one wonder what their use is?
As shown in the California case, reclosing a breaker not only
creates a potential danger to anyone who may touch the wire,
but continues the short circuit at the risk of starting a fire. The
operation of a circuit breaker or a ground detector is notice to
the electric plant operator that something is wrong and is at
least significant in determining the duty of the electric company
until the irregularity is located and remedied.
Notice of an untoward situation may likewise come to the
company in the form of a direct oral communication, as in the
case of Osborne v. Tennessee Electric Power Co. 21 In this case
a building was on fire very near the defendant's high voltage
wires, and- flames were reaching the wires. The defendant was
notified twice. Instead of turning off the current, the defendant
sent a truck with line men, from a distance. They did not reach
the scene for an hour. In the meantime a wire burned through
and electrocuted a fireman. The court said that it should have
been left to the jury to decide whether this was negligence.
"We do not undertake to announce any hard and fast rule;
each case must depend upon its own facts. We do not mean
to say that in every instance the defendant should shut off
its current upon being advised that its line was being endan-
gered. It is also proper for the jury to take into considera-
tion the means and methods by which the current is shut
off, the necessary time it takes and the territory and elec-
trically run plants that would be affected thereby."
21. 158 Tenn. 278, 12 S. W. (2d) 947 (1929) ; accord, Lutolf v. United
Electric Light Co., 184 Mass. 53, 67 N. E. 1025 (1903).
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It is submitted that this case involves considerations similar to
those in the Kentucky case and that the Tennessee decision is
preferable. Indeed, the Kentucky case offers the clearer situa-
tion for presenting this issue to the jury.22
All too frequently someone using an electric light or appliance
in his home or place of work receives a violent charge of elec-
tricity and is injured or killed. In cases of this sort the question
arises whether an ordinary domestic current of 110 volts is
dangerous. If not, as is usually found to be the case, how did
a stronger current happen to be in such a place, and whose is
the blame ?23 There are few states in which questions of this
sort have not reached the appellate courts, and Missouri has
its share.
The electric company will not be liable without negligence. In
what way is it at fault? Leaving out the possibility of lightning
for the moment, how does a high voltage current get into a 110
volt circuit? In the first place, was it due to the negligence of
the electric company that the high voltage got beyond the trans-
former which is supposed to turn out a current of approximately
110 volts? This may be due to a defective transformer, and if so,
the company will ordinarily be liable.2 4 More frequently it will
be due to some accidental contact which permits the current from
a high voltage feed line to flow into a house circuit. The prob-
lem of discovery of such conditions through inspections, circuit
breakers, ground detectors and the like is the same as in connec-
tion with other cases already discussed. The generally recognized
22. Illinois Power and Light Corp. v. Hurley, 49 F. (2d) 681 (C. C. A.
8, 1931), indicates that an electric company cannot exonerate itself merely
by providing the various mechanical safety devices. To the defendant's
argument that the circuit breaker did not show anything wrong, the court
states that this merely shows that in this instance the leakage of current,
although it started a $250,000 fire, was not sufficient to cause the device to
work.
23. If it is clear that the voltage doing the harm is not excessive, the
electric company ordinarily will not be liable. Its duty is to deliver 110
volts at the meter. Installations on the customer's side of the meter are
not under its control. Solomon v. Moberly Light & Power Co., 303 Mo.
622, 262 S. W. 367 (1924). "But if the defendant negligently permitted
2300 volts to pass into the drop cord it can make no difference in its lia-
bility that the laundry company (deceased's employer) assisted by furnish-
ing an improperly insulated drop cord." If both were negligent, both are
responsible. Vessels v. Kansas Light and Power Co., 219 S. W. 80 (Mo.,
1920).
24. Yarnell v. Mo. Utilities Co., 23 S. W. (2d) 225 (Mo. App., 1929).
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high degree of care is imposed on electric companies with respect
to this hazard.
In Vessels v. Kansas City Light & Power Co.,25 the Supreme
Court said, "The negligent act of defendant was complete when
the fatal current was permitted to escape to the secondary wire
entering the laundry. There was evidence that these wires were
knowingly permitted by defendant to rub against each other from
the action of the wind, during a period of at least 10 months."
In Marrow v. Missouri Gas & Electric Service Co.,20 the de-
ceased went to the shower bath in the basement of his home,
and was found lying dead on the floor the next morning. He had
perhaps taken hold of a drop cord while standing barefoot on
a damp concrete floor in such a way that his body would furnish
a ground from the drop cord. Evidence was admitted to the
effect that a normal house current would not normally be fatal.
There was, however, evidence of contact between the secondary
or house line and a primary circuit, carrying a dangerously high
voltage. This is one of the few cases which discusses the prob-
lem raised by fuses. The average person knows that in his home
there is a fuse box and that occasionally one of these fuses will
burn out and have to be replaced. As is usual in such cases, a
part of the defense evidence tended to suggest that a fatal cur-
rent would have burned out meter, fuses and lights, whereas no
such condition could be shown to have happened. This defendant
also was equipped with automatic circuit breakers and with
ground detectors, recording ammeters, and volt meters, none of
which showed any electric disturbance on the night in question.
It was shown by the plaintiff that an excessive current will not
cause instantaneous melting of fuses, but requires about a half
minute, whereas, "in case of an excessive current passing
through a human body serving as a contact between a secondary
wire and the ground, the surge of electricity would be almost
instantaneous, and could or might result in the death of the per-
son serving as the contact without blowing out or injuring the
fuses, lamps or meter in the house."27 The Supreme Court of
Missouri, affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, said, "We be-
lieve the evidence is sufficiently substantial to establish defen-
25. 219 S. W. 80 (Mo., 1920), cited supra, note 23.
26. 315 Mo. 367, 286 S. W. 106 (1926).
27. Ibid. at 379.
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dant's negligence, or at least to justify the submission of that
issue to the jury, as one of fact."28
INJURIES NOT DUE TO ELECTRIC SHOCK
Not only does the electric light and power business involve
duties and liabilities for injuries from electric current, but these
companies, in common with telephone and telegraph companies,
have responsibilities as to injuries caused by defective struc-
tures, such as falling or tipping poles, sagging wires or wires so
placed as to cause injuries due to contact not including electric
shock, guy wires, and holes prepared to receive poles and not
yet filled. All these may, under certain circumstances, create risks
which involve harm to others, calling for the decision of courts.
There are also harms due to falling light wires or fixtures.
Through all this range of fact situations there runs a stream of
reference to res ipsa loquitur, that ready work-helper of a court
which sees a potentially dangerous situation, an injured plaintiff
and no clear showing of conduct on the part of the defendant
reprehensible enough by other tests or formulas to give the court
a basis for sending the case to the jury.
A falling insulator injured the plaintiff in Hoover v. Ry. Co.,29
and it was pointed out that the reasonable time that is allowed
an electric company for repair after a storm is of no avail as a
defense where the accident is not due to a storm, but to an
appliance which negligently has been allowed to fall into dis-
repair.3 0
28. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Arnston, 157 Fed. 540 (1907), held
that an electric light company is under a duty to prevent a dangerous cur-
rent of electricity from entering a dwelling, it being the our-rent which was
generated under the exclusive control of defendant which caused the injury
and not the lamps and wires, which, disconnected from the live current,
would be harmless. McAllister v. Pryor, 187 N. C. 832, 123 S. E. 92 (1924),
it was held that evidence, showing that one had used an electric iron and
received a severe shock, indicating an excessive voltage, is enough to take
to the jury the question of the negligence of the defendant, as one engaged
in distributing electric current.
29. 159 Mo. App. 416, 140 S. W. 321 (1911).
30. In Gibbs v. Poplar Bluff Light & Power Co., 142 Mo. App. 19, 125
S. W. 840 (1910), the plaintiff was injured by a falling reflector from an
arc light which was shaken loose by the vibration of the pole when de-
fendant's employee started to climb. Plaintiff was allowed to go to the
jury without showing what caused the reflector to fall. The falling object
may be a "hot wire," in which case the scope of the duty and the nature
of its violation presents no different problem than that of any other falling
body. The probability is, of course, that through grounding there may be
greater harm. Bloom v. Union Elec. Light and Power Co., 251 S. W. 411
(Mo. App., 1923).
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So clearly recognized is the danger of wires sagging over
passageways, whether charged with high voltage currents or
not, that statutes or ordinances usually exist regulating the
heights at which they must be placed. If one walking or driving
along a highway is caught under the chin by a sagging wire,
injury is almost inevitable, and, as might be expected, the defen-
dant usually is made responsible. 31 The defendant's lack of actual
notice that the wire has sagged is met by the courts with a "duty
of frequent inspection.32
Contributory negligence in encountering the wire will go to
the jury with the rest of the circumstances. In such a case it
has been held not an act of contributory negligence to cross the
street where there is no cross walk.33 This formula, as applied
to one who encounters a wire at such a point, means that even
though one does cross the street there, he is nevertheless entitled
to do so without being subjected to this particular risk.
The defensive argument that the plaintiff is a tresspasser,
which is so often resorted to by electric companies, has been
invoked even in the case of a sagging wire over a public road-
way. In a Missouri case,3" the defendant's high voltage wire
was strung across the roadway among a number of other wires
of similar appearance. The plaintiff was moving a house with-
out a permit, and was injured in attempting to raise the wires
for the passage of the house. The court recognized that one has
a right to be free from such a risk and, finding that houses were
sometimes moved and that this general practice was known to
the defendants, was able to satisfy itself that the conventional
foreseeability test of negligence was met, and, using the foresee-
ability test again to answer the defendant's proximate cause ar-
gument, permitted a recovery. This application of the proximate
cause formula was also made to take care of the argument that
the plaintiff had failed to secure a house moving permit. The
31. Sinclair v. Columbia Telephone Co. 195 S. W. 558 (Mo. App., 1917).
A wire crossing over public road hung so low that it caught the top of the
buggy. This frightened the horse; the buggy was overturned and the plain-
tiff thrown out.
32. Burr v. Limestone Tel. Co., 97 W. Va. 508, 125 S. E. 335 (1924);
Weaver v. Dawson County Tel. Co., 82 Neb. 696, 118 N. V. 650 (1908);
Interstate Power Co. v. Thomas, 51 F. (2d) 964 (C. C. A. 8, 1931).
33. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Howell, 124 Ga. 1050, 53 S. E. 577 (1906).
34. Blackburn v. Southwest Mo. Ry. Co., 180 Mo. App. 548, 167 S. V. 457
(1914). This case is noted in (1927) 15 Cal. L. Rev. 455.
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absence of the permit was not the proximate cause of the injury.
The court added that if the plaintiff was a trespasser in using
the streets for house moving, he was only technically so.
Poles not infrequently fall, and in most instances it would
seem not unreasonable that the owner should be responsible for
resulting injuries35
The dangers of the foreseeability formula as a test of causa-
tion are illustrated in a North Carolina case36 involving a falling
pole. This case, it is submitted, reached an incorrect result. The
defendant's negligence, about which there seems to be no ques-
tion, resulted in one of its poles falling across a road. A traveller
passing along attempted to prop it up with a stick. As the plain-
tiff's intestate was passing that point the pole fell from its tem-
porary support and struck her upon the head. A verdict for the
plaintiff was set aside on the theory that the injury was due, as
a matter of law, to an independent intervening cause which was
not foreseeable. A long opinion dealing with proximate cause
may mean that, due to factors not frankly discussed, this court
was not of the opinion that this loss should be shifted to the
defendant telephone company, or it may mean that the court's
attention was diverted from its function of determining the duty
issue by the causation argument.
INDUCTION AND ELECTROLYSIS
Another harm which may arise in the operation of electrical
power transmission is that of inductive interference with other
devices using lower tension currents. A telephone line, radio
apparatus, or other delicate electrical device may be in operation
in a particular place. A high power transmission line is set up
nearby, and inductive interference and the escape of grounded
current interfere with the more delicate adjustments of the tele-
phone, radio or other device. It seems to be settled that the power
35. Meehan v. Union Electric Light and Power Co., 252 Mo. 609, 161
S. W. 825 (1913). A rope was strung on recently set poles to keep back
a large crowd of people who were watching a parade. A pole gave way
because the cement in which it was set had not hardened. The decision was
for the defendant on the ground that there was no negligence as a matter
of law. This is probably an acceptable judgment, but the case is hard to
reconcile with many generalizations that indicate that, by the foreseeability
of harm test for the existence of negligence, the defendant need not fore-
see the particular kind of harm which resulted. See, for example, Hudson v.
Union Electric Light and Power Co., 234 S. W. 869 (Mo. App., 1921).
36. Harton v. Forest City Tel. Co., 146 N. C. 429, 59 S. E. 1022 (1907).
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company is not liable. Although the doctrine of Fletcher v. By-
land3S was at once invoked when this problem first arose in En-
gland, it was not applied. The leading English case gave as the
reason for not applying Fletcher v. Rylands to escaping elec-
tricity, that the plaintiff could not, by reason of the special re-
quirements, of his business, impose upon the defendant the bur-
den of so-called "liability without fault."88
Relief was denied against the same type of injury in a recent
American case 9 in which the plaintiff urged the idea of nuisance
as justifying the court finding for him. There is no question
37. L. R. 1 Ex. (1866), L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868). This famous doctrine
as stated by Blackburn, J. is, "that the person who for his own purposes
brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mis-
chief if it escapes must keep it at his peril ... etc." The doctrine has been
recognized in Missouri and was applied to explosives in French v. Manu-
facturing Co., 173 Mo. App. 220, 158 S. W. 723 (1913). In addition to
quoting with approval from Fletcher v. Rylands the court said: "We hold
that where plaintiff alleges and proves that defendant stored a large quan-
tity of nitroglycerine on its premises the very act of keeping it there in
dangerous quantities is a nuisance per se so far as it effects or damages
those within the danger zone." Earlier Missouri cases accepting the doc-
trine are referred to.
38. Eastern and South African Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town Tramway
Co., L. R. App. C. 381 (1902); and in America, the Cincinnati Ry. v. City
and Suburban Tel. Ass'n, 48 Ohio St. 390, 27 N. E. 890 (1891). In both
cases it was found that the telephone company could protect itself by a
return metallic circuit (instead of a grounded circuit) against interference
complained of.
39. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Pac. Gas and Electric Co., 202 Cal.
382, 260 Pac. 1101 (1927). Two dissents consider this a nuisance within the
statutory definition, see. 3479 of Cal. Civil Code. A note (1928) 16 Cal. L.
Rev. 331, approves the dissent on the nuisance theory and suggests priority
in time as determining priority in right, and also suggests the operation
of other factors than legalistic doctrines as pertinent: "Perhaps the rela-
tive importance of power service and telegraph service influences a court
to protect the power company, because it feels that it serves more people
and satisfies greater economic needs." It is submitted this hypothesis will
not do. The interests are too nearly balanced to be the subject of choice
upon such considerations in a judicial act. The court will be driven to
resort to some of the traditional formulas for a rationale for its decision.
In any event the disposition of the case under the circumstances involved
was probably as satisfactory as could well be made in point of conflicting
social interests or of justice as between the parties. The court affirmed an
order of the State Railroad Commission for the relocation of the plaintiff's
line at a distance outside the range of inductive lines of force from de-
fendant's wires, the costs of which was to borne jointly by the two com-
panies. Yamhill Co. Mutual Telephone Co. v. Yamhill Elec. Co., 111 Or.
57, 224 Pac. 1081 (1924), held that defendant electric company was liable
for interference with the plaintiff's telephone caused by ground conduction,
but it was said that there would be liability without negligence in cases
where the power current escaped by induction. See 23 A. L. R. 1257 and
33 A. L. R. 380 for a collection of the few authorities available.
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of negligence in the ordinary sense, as there is no element of
fault or culpability in carrying on a legitimate business for a
justifiable purpose. Thus, the result of these cases would seem
to be satisfactory.
Electric companies have also been sued for harms resulting
from the electrolysis of underground water and gas pipes be-
cause of grounded currents. The relief usually asked for and
allowed in such cases is in equity, chiefly by way of injunction.0
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
As might be expected, the victim of the activities of an elec-
tric light and power company, whether he suffers shock or is
struck by something falling from a pole, seldom knows or can
obtain information as to just what conditions or possible acts
or omissions by the electric company caused the injury. The
usual circumstances being such, it is to be expected, as the Mis-
souri Supreme Court said in Glasco Electric Co. v. Union Elec-
tric Co.41 that:
"The res ipsac loquitur doctrine finds frequent application
in cases against electric companies, and when in such cases
the petition charges general negligence only and the facts
and circumstances show that, without fault on the part of
the plaintiff, the injury or damage complained of was caused
by the escape of electricity from wires under the exclusive
control and managament of such company and the occur-
rence is such as does not ordinarily happen if those having
such control and management use proper care, a presump-
tion or inference of negligence or want of proper care on the
part of defendant electric company arises and the weight
of the inference as well as the weight of such explanation,
if any, which the defendant makes, is for the jury."'42
The appropriateness of res ipsa loquitur in electricity cases is
recognized in most jurisdiction and is, indeed, in a very consider-
40. 20 C. J. 363, note 74a. Peoria Waterworks v. Peoria Co., 181 Fed.
990 (C. C. Ill., 1910). The writer has found no Missouri cases on harms
due to either induction or electrolysis.
41. 332 Mo. 1079, 61 S. W. (2d) 955 (1933).
42. For a general discussion of the scope, effect and applicability of the
doctrine, see McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 46 S. W. (2d) 557 (1932).
In 50 Mo. Bull. L. S. 63, the elements of res ipsa loquitzr are started as
follows: "The res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies when the following factors
are present: (1) Occurences, resulting in an injury, which do not often
happen if due care is used; (2) the instrumentalities are under the control
of the defendant; and, (3) defendant possesses superior knowledge or
means of information concerning the occurrence."
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able proportion of these cases, the plaintiff's most potent weapon.
It has been employed successfully in connection with practically
all of the various types of injury resulting from electricity. In
Roster v. Interstate Power Company,'43 the deceased touched an
electric light switch in his home and was instantly killed. The
Supreme Court of South Dakota, affirming the trial court in
-overruling the defendant's demurrer, said that: "Plaintiff could
not be expected to know the specific acts or omissions which
caused the negligence-what may have caused the passage of an
excessive current over the secondary wires into the dwelling is
.peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant company." The
,same position has been stated by the Texas courts :44
"All that an average person could know and therefore all
that he would be required to allege was that the injury was
the result of an excessive and dangerous current, and he
would know this only because experience has taught that a
current such as is commonly used in lighting houses is not
dangerous, and that in such case there is no danger in at-
taching an electric iron to a socket. When injury occurs in
such use, of course, there is a defect somewhere. Where and
what it is, is known only to experts in the use and manage-
ment of electricity."
Illustrations might be multiplied. The Iowa Supreme Court
went so far as to say that where a person is found dead in a
house under circumstances which permit the inference of electric
shock as a cause, the jury may find that it was due to negligence
of the electric company.45
In Missouri the full power of this doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is limited by the rule that a plaintiff who alleges specific acts of
negligence is not permitted to invoke the doctrine. However, the
court still retains control over this question in any case, in de-
,ciding whether the petition does charge specific acts of negli-
gence. The writer fails to find sufficient consistency or uniform-
43. 58 S. D. 521, 237 N. W. 738 (1931). The house current was sup-
posedly 110 volts stepped down from a 2200 volt feed line. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant negligently permitted the heavier current to
enter the Roster home and to cause the instant death of the plaintiff's
husband.
44. Texas Power and Light Co. v. Bristow, 213 S. W. 702 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1919).
45. Welsch v. Charles Frusch Light and Power Co., 197 Ia. 1012, 193
N. W. 427 (1923).
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ity in the interpretation of petitions as to the application of this
rule, in the reported cases, to give the pleader very substantial
aid.
In Saunders v. City of Carthage,46 the Supreme Court reviews
a number of earlier Missouri decisions involving the point and
attempts to generalize. In several cases the plaintiff had alleged
that the defendant permitted high tension current to pass over
certain wires. In commenting on this form of allegation, Com-
missioner Hyde stated:
"The word permit implies knowledge and consent. It
means to allow after notice or knowledge. Hence it means
the same thing as alleging that defendant permitted the
condition to exist when it knew or, by the exercise of due
care required of it, could have known of it in time to have
remedied it, before the plaintiff's son came in contact with
it."
Res ipsa loquitur is not confined in its application to cases of
shock. It is traditionally most appropriate in cases of injury
due to falling objects 47 and has been applied to cases of shock
against a telephone company as well as against electric light
companies."
The only general observation which would seem to be justified
from a study of the functioning of the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur in the Missouri cases, would seem to be that it is to the plain-
tiff's advantage to keep allegations of specific acts of negligence
out of his petition so far as possible.
As indicating the power of this doctrine in just such cases as
those involving har-m due to electricity, a commentator makes an
interesting comment :49
"In some cases involving extra hazardous activity, the
courts, being reluctant to defy the fault rule of liability, have
raised a presumption in the plaintiff's favor and required
the defendant to sustain the burden of proof in the rebuttal.
46. 330 Mo. 844, 51 S. W. (2d) 529 (1932).
47. Kuether v. Kansas City Light and Power Co., 220 Mo. App. 452, 276
S. W. 105 (1925); Bloom v. Union Electric Light and Power Co., 251 S. W.
411 (Mo. App., 1923). That res ipsa loquitur applies to falling objects
generally, see Demun Estate Corp. v. Frankfort Ins. Co., 196 Mo. App. 17,
187 S. W. 1124 (1916); Kean v. Smith Piano Co., 206 Mo. App. 170, 227
S. W. 1091 (1921).
48. Joyce v. Mo. and Kan. Telephone Co., 211 S. W. 900 (Mo. App., 1918).
But see Inman v. Home Telephone Co., 105 Wash. 234, 177 Pac. 670 (1919).
49. Note, 3 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev. 126 (1935).
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Since it is frequently impossible for the defendant to extri-
cate himself from this situation, the courts really inflict ab-
solute liability. Thus by a circuitous method the case is
taken out of the field of evidence and into the substantive
law of torts."
TRESPASSERS
It has been noted that injury from electric shock is usually
due to electric currents in places where they do not belong, and
that in such cases the plaintiff may well be able to show where
he was and what happened to him and rely on the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. On the other hand, injured persons may be
where they do not belong when they encounter dangerous cur-
rents and hence be outside the sphere of any duty owed to them
by the electric company. What bearing does a trespass by the
injured person have upon the outcome of such a case? Who is
a trespasser in this connection? These cases should be considered
as belonging to at least three groups:
Adult trespassers on the electric company's own premises or
structures. As to this class of persons the law is usually admin-
istered through the formulas employed in defining the duty of
land owners to trespassers. Sometimes it becomes necessary to
decide whether a particular person is a trespasser. For example,
a telephone lineman, who must necessarily climb a pole carrying
high voltage wires or carry h telephone wire over a light or
power line in doing his own work, is not a trespasser, and there
is a duty to anticipate his possible presence and to observe such
precautions as maintaining insulation in proper condition. The
injured party's status is usually a question of fact.'5
Infant trespassers. If the trespassers happen to be children,
the local developments of the turntable doctrine will be important
50. Hill v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 260 Mo. 43, 169 S. W. 345(1914) ; Downs v. Andrews, 145 Mo. App. 173, 130 S. W. 472 (1910). But
where a lineman uses the poles of another company for convenience in
stringing lines without the owner's knowledge, actual or constructive, this
does not impose upon the owner of the poles any duty toward such lineman.
Mahaney v. City of Independence, 183 S. W. 1117 (Mo. App. 1916). In
Smith v. Southwest Mo. Ry. Co., 333 Mo. 314, 62 S. W. (2d) 761 (1933),
the plaintiff was burned by the arcing of current from a defective appara-
tus in a substation where he was a licensee. The substation belonged to and
was maintained by an electric railway. It was held that the power com-
pany from which current was obtained and which was joined as defendant
was not liable, but the court remarked that, "knowledge of the defective
and dangerous condition of a customer's appliance will charge even a sup-
plier of current with liability where current is supplied thereafter to such
dangerous and defective appliance." However, the supplier was under no
duty to inspect the customer's apparatus.
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if not decisive. The infant trespasser, attractive nuisance, or
turntable doctrine, as it has variously been designated, is known
to Missouri jurisprudence, but, as the Supreme Court has stated,
it has been conservatively applied.51
On the whole, the Missouri courts, in cases involving actions
for the death or injury to children trespassing upon the property
of electric producers and distributors, have been unwilling to
shift the loss on the defendant 2
Trespassers upon the property of others over which the defen-
dant's wires are strung, or upon which they fall. Where the per-
son injured, whether child or adult, is not a trespasser as against
the defendant electric company, but both the injured person and
the wire are on the land of a third party, the defense of tres-
pass may not be invoked. Missouri courts have clearly recog-
nized and repeatedly asserted this doctrine.5 3
51. O'Hara v. Gas Light Co., 244 Mo. 395, 148 S. W. 844 (1912).
52. See McCleary, The Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri to
Persons Injured While on the Land (1936) 1 Mo. L. Rev. 45-50, which con-
tains a more extended consideration of the Missouri development of the
"attractive nuisance doctrine" than is apposite here and which includes a
collection of the authorities. Typical among the cases involving electricity
are: Blavatt v. Union Electric Light and Power Co., 335 Mo. 151, 71 S. W.
(2d) 736 (1934), where a boy climbed a wall surrounding a transformer in
order to retrieve a ball; Howard v. St. Joseph Transmission Co., 316 Mo.
317, 289 S. W. 597 (1926), where boy "shinned" up electric Company's pole
to disentangle fish line; and State ex rel. Kansas City Light and Power Co.
v. Trimble, 315 Mo. 32, 285 S. W. 455 (1926), another case in which a boy
climbed company's light pole.
In a foot note in his case book, The Judicial Process in Tort Cases, Dean
Leon Green has summarized at page 521 the scope of the duty of electric
companies to children as follows: "The responsibilities of power companies
for children who are injured by coming into contact with wires, etc., on the
premises of the company is usually placed upon the turntable or attractive
nuisance doctrine. But the doctrine is here extended in three particulars:
(1) The negligence formula employed is normally expressed as requiring
a "high degree or care" or "the highest degree of care," etc. (2) The "an-
ticipation" required is easily satisfied. (3) The age at which the child will
be held guilty of contributory negligence is set at a higher limit."
58. Godfrey v. Kansas City Light and Power Co., 213 Mo. App. 139, 247
S. W. 451 (1922) presented a case in which an uninsulated wire passed
through the branches of a tree located on premises frequently visited by
children. The court said that "assuming plaintiff's son was a trespasser...
he was not a trespasser as to the defendant." Aff'd 299 Mo. 472, 253 S. W.
233 (1923). See, also, Shannon v. Kansas City Light & Power Co., 315
Mo. 1136, 287 S. W. 1031 (1926), where a boy contacted sagging wires in
the branches of a tree. In Beckwith v. City or Malden, 212 Mo. App. 488,
253 S. W. 17 (1923), the court said: "One who stretches wires charged with
electricity through the branches of a tree which children can climb, must
anticipate the presence of children in such tree and is negligent in per-
mitting its wires there to remain uninsulated after knowledge that insula-
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After some vacillation the cases seem to be coming around to
the conclusion that although one may be a trespasser as to the
owner of the premises, that does not make him one as to an
electric company which might, except for the technical trespass,
be liable for his injury or death.
CONCLUSION
This paper has in no sense been intended as a digest of all the
Missouri cases involving tort actions for death or personal injury
due to electricity and falling wires. The object in view has been
rather to select a few of them as illustrative. The cases com-
mented upon in the text were chosen in some instances because
they present typical fact-problems, representative of a large num-
ber of similar cases, and in other instances, because of striking
language in the opinion which seemed particularly well to illus-
trate articulation of the judicial process. Many other cases deal-
ing with different circumstances of injury involving electricity
have been omitted, as has the whole matter of contributory neg-
ligence. Many of the cases reviewed herein deal with the plain-
tiff's conduct, and it may be remarked in passing that in very
few of them did the court find contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law, that problem usually being left to the jury.
The field is so large that not every ear of corn can be exam-
ined. It becomes necessary to attempt a determination of qual-
ity by sampling. Samples have been selected and some analysis
attempted. Have we learned anything of the judicial process in
these cases? Is it possible to articulate from these cases a skele-
ton of the process by which they are decided, and to recreate the
body of social phenomena which produced them? Even though
we cannot trace a pattern of decision, we have at least seen pre-
sented before the courts a slice of life in twentieth century civil-
ization. We have seen that it is very different from life in feudal
England or from that Victorian England within which the for-
mulas of tort liability for negligence were written. The funda-
mental formulas were given shape in the process of deciding the
cases presented to the courts of that day, as they arose out of
the life of that period, industrially a much more simple era. In
modern tort cases, we have civilization presented as a perilous
tion is off." There are numerous other Missouri cases to the same effect.
This rule is followed almost uniformly. For an extensive collection of cases
from many jurisdictions, see Note, 56 A. L. R. 1021 (1928).
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condition. Accidents are of frequent occurrence: bursting water
pipes, leaking gas followed by explosions or asphyxiation, elec-
trocution, automobile collisions, et cetera. We have seen life a
dangerous adventure among strange new machines: this Frank-
enstein man has created. Have the courts shown us that they
have power to tame it? Can they hold the mechanical age ac-
countable for the injuries it inflicts? Are they attempting to
do so?
Have the courts as they move from one new problem to an-
other bound themselves in the toils of words, definitions, and doc-
trines, or have they cast off the older conceptions where they
hampered the free administration of justice? Are cases being
decided by men who see beyond the rules and deal with human
relations in society, or are the courts but countinghouses where
the interests and responsibilities of men are measured by the
yardstocks of legal formula? Can we not see at least here and
there, the human touch of factors outside the books of the law.
If one looks for these factors, occasionally they may be dis-
covered. If they can be found even occasionally, is it not ap-
parent that a judgment can no more be made by the yardstick
application of a mere formula of words than a sunset can be
weighed or measured, or a wave cast in a mould?
To attempt to reduce the findings to a conclusion:
1. A vast number of negligence actions have been brought
against utilities companies.
2. There is a tendency to find a rationale for sending the
question of legal responsibility to the jury.
3. There is little real evidence for or against specific acts of
negligence on the part of defendants in a great proportion of
these cases.
4. The res ipsa loquitur formula is very extensively resorted
to and approved by the courts.
5. The "reasonable probability of harm" standard is employed
in such a way as to make it the duty of the operator to exercise
the highest degree of care and to use the best and latest equip-
ment in the way of safety devices.
6. All this does tend to put the risk of harm upon the defen-
dants, who do enjoy a widespread source of revenue, and hence
can distribute the loss. But a recognition of this element is very
seldom, if ever, expressed in cases of this sort.
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